When Escalation Becomes the Strategy: What Venezuela, Gaza, and Ukraine Reveal About Modern Brinkmanship

National security lawyer and renowned geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman breaks down why signalling strength without exit plans creates diplomatic traps that are harder to escape than the crises themselves.

The United States is positioning naval assets near Venezuela. Gaza's fragile ceasefire shows cracks barely weeks after implementation. Ukraine peace negotiations have devolved into leaked embarrassments. On the surface, these crises seem disconnected—different regions, different actors, different timelines. But according to geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, they share a dangerous common thread: escalation has become the policy itself, not the path to resolution.

In her latest session on KAJ Masterclass LIVE, Tsukerman dissected how modern powers have fallen into a pattern where showing force substitutes for strategic thinking. The result? Leaders climb escalation ladders without knowing how to climb back down, creating traps that box in decision-makers and make accidental conflict more likely than intended outcomes.

Venezuela: When Legal Shortcuts Undermine Military Signaling

The Trump administration's approach to Venezuela reveals how tactical wins can create strategic losses. By designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations and authorizing strikes on boats allegedly transporting fentanyl, the White House signaled serious intent to pressure the Maduro regime. Closing Venezuelan airspace and moving naval assets added weight to the message. On paper, it looks like textbook coercive diplomacy.

The problem emerged in execution. Rather than seeking congressional authorization for military action—the route George W. Bush took after 9/11 with clear legal cover—the administration rushed ahead with executive action. Tsukerman points out they already had the predicate: cartels designated as terrorists, fentanyl framed as a weapon of mass destruction, evidence of collaboration with hostile regimes. A simple Authorization for Use of Military Force request would have provided ironclad legal standing.

"All Trump had to do is exactly what George W. Bush did after the al-Qaeda attacks—ask for an authorization for military operation in self-defense. The administration would have been in the clear completely." — Irina Tsukerman

Instead, the boat strikes triggered bipartisan congressional backlash. Reports emerged that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth may have authorized a second strike and allegedly ordered survivors killed. Whether true or not, the controversy shifted focus from Maduro's crimes to American legal processes. The result is maximum political heat with minimal strategic gain—exactly the outcome the administration wanted to avoid.

What makes this particularly frustrating, according to Tsukerman, is that the broader strategy was working. Isolating Maduro economically, limiting his international movement, signaling to regional partners that Washington was serious—these pressure points don't require boots on the ground. But now Congress is investigating the administration instead of supporting it, and allies like the United Kingdom have frozen intelligence cooperation over concerns about international law violations.

The bigger risk? A large ground war in Venezuela would be wildly unpopular with Trump's base. Even limited operations risk spiraling into open-ended commitments. The U.S. has no exit strategy, no clear transition plan if Maduro falls, and limited regional support beyond a few Caribbean nations.

Gaza Phase 2: Reconstruction Without Consequences

The second phase of the Gaza ceasefire was supposed to demonstrate that diplomatic persistence could break cycles of violence. Instead, it's becoming a case study in how process can substitute for progress. Hamas controls roughly half of Gaza. Israel controls the other half as a temporary buffer zone. Neither side has incentive to change the status quo, yet reconstruction money is already flowing.

Tsukerman highlights the absurdity: Hamas just returned a body to Israel as part of hostage negotiations. The problem? It was a random corpse, not one of the two remaining hostages Israel demanded. Rather than halting negotiations, the process continues. The United States has admitted it cannot enforce Hamas disarmament, yet promises reconstruction aid will proceed in Israeli-controlled areas.

"Letting Hamas remain in any portion of Gaza guarantees that sooner or later combat will resume. None of this provides any advantage—it sends the message that countries are willing to put in money to reconstruct Gaza without any concessions from Hamas." — Irina Tsukerman

This creates perverse incentives. Hamas faces no accountability for two years of warfare, for the infrastructure it diverted for military purposes, for the hostages it still holds. Instead, it watches international donors prepare to rebuild Gaza—infrastructure it can reclaim the moment Israel withdraws. Multiple countries have pledged peacekeeping forces, but only after Hamas is disarmed. Since no one will disarm Hamas, the peacekeepers never arrive. The stalemate becomes permanent.

Meanwhile, the West Bank deteriorates. Hamas cells receive weapons from Iran. Islamic Jihad escalates operations. Israel conducts security sweeps that temporarily clear areas but cannot hold ground permanently. The same pattern that led to the current Gaza crisis is now replicating in the West Bank, yet the international community remains focused on reconstruction plans that avoid the core issue: who governs Gaza, and under what terms?

Ukraine: When Private Deals Replace Public Strategy

If Venezuela shows tactical errors undermining strategy, and Gaza shows process substituting for progress, Ukraine reveals something worse: private business interests masquerading as peace negotiations. Leaked communications exposed Trump envoy Steve Witkoff being coached by Russian contacts on how to present Moscow's preferred peace terms to the White House. He wasn't negotiating on behalf of American interests—he was helping Russia package its demands in language the Trump administration would accept.

The original plan contained 28 points drafted in Moscow. When Ukrainian and European allies rejected it, a revised 19-point version emerged. But Witkoff and Jared Kushner—the same architects of the discredited first attempt—were sent to Moscow to meet with Putin. They spent five hours in discussions. China's foreign minister attended. No specific language from any peace plan was discussed.

"Witkoff seems to be valuing this idea of having Russia succeed in selling its own version of events above the fact that they're literally manipulating US policy." — Irina Tsukerman

Tsukerman draws a parallel to Rob Malley, the Obama-Biden Iran envoy who was eventually removed for mishandling classified information and essentially leaking U.S. strategy to Tehran in hopes of securing a deal. Witkoff appears to value the achievement of "a deal"—any deal—over whether that deal serves American interests. Secretary of State Marco Rubio initially admitted to senators the plan originated in Russia, then had to publicly retract and claim it was American in origin. The diplomatic embarrassment is complete.

Putin, meanwhile, has already stated he will reject the 19-point version and will make no concessions of his own. Yet the charade continues. The Trump administration floats blocking Ukraine's NATO membership—already functionally impossible since occupied territories disqualify entry. Miami meetings between Ukrainian and American diplomats recycle talking points that have appeared repeatedly since 2022. Nothing new emerges except rotation of Ukrainian negotiators after corruption scandals force out previous officials.

The pattern is clear: This peace process gives Putin cover to continue striking civilians while projecting an image of diplomatic engagement. Russia gets time to consolidate territorial gains. Private business figures maintain access for future commercial opportunities. American strategic interests remain absent from the equation.

The Escalation Trap

"The danger lies in how quickly a situation can slide from signaling into actual combat. Once the escalation ladder is climbed, it is hard to descend without visible concessions from one side or the other." — Irina Tsukerman

This captures the core problem across all three crises. Escalation as signaling works when both sides understand the off-ramps. But when legal authority is unclear, when accountability mechanisms don't exist, when private interests corrupt public negotiations, the signals become noise. Leaders find themselves committed to positions they never intended to hold, facing choices between backing down publicly or escalating further into conflicts they don't actually want.

The Broader Pattern: What Diplomatic Breakdown Looks Like

Beyond these three hotspots, Tsukerman identified troubling signs elsewhere. China's consul general in Japan literally threatened to behead the country's prime minister over Taiwan support—language that would have ended diplomatic careers five years ago. Yet he wasn't expelled. Japan protested rhetorically but pulled back from substantive retaliation, wary of economic consequences.

This normalization of extreme rhetoric represents its own form of escalation. When threats that once ended careers become negotiating positions, the range of acceptable behavior expands. Adversaries test boundaries, find them soft, and push further.

Why This Matters Beyond the Headlines

For business leaders and investors, these patterns reveal how geopolitical risk compounds. Venezuela affects energy markets and regional stability throughout Latin America. Gaza instability threatens broader Middle East security architectures. Ukraine's unresolved status keeps European defense spending elevated and supply chains uncertain. More importantly, the pattern of escalation-without-strategy suggests other flashpoints could follow similar trajectories.

For policymakers, Tsukerman's analysis offers a warning: tactical flexibility without strategic clarity leads to being trapped by your own rhetoric. The appearance of strength can create the reality of weakness when adversaries simply wait for contradictions to emerge.

For anyone trying to understand why conflicts that should be resolvable remain frozen, the answer increasingly lies not in the specific disputes but in the processes meant to address them. When signaling replaces strategy, when process substitutes for progress, when private interests corrupt public negotiations, escalation becomes self-sustaining regardless of anyone's actual intentions.

What Else We Covered

The full masterclass also examined Putin's upcoming India visit, where defense deals matter less than the optics of standing beside Modi to project continued global relevance despite Western isolation. Tsukerman detailed how Russia-India defense relationships complicate U.S. attempts to build an Indo-Pacific coalition against China, and why closing Venezuelan airspace functions as economic warfare disguised as safety precautions.

Watch the complete KAJ Masterclass LIVE episode on YouTube

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Full Conversation Transcript (Unedited — Shared Exactly as It Happened)

Transcript:

(00:19) Welcome to this episode of the world according to Arena Shukerman. Our very special series on global politics on the world on the KJ masterclass live. Ireina Ashukman is a US-based national security and human rights lawyer as well as a renowned geopolitical analyst.

(00:38) Her writings and commentary have been have appeared in diverse US and international media and have been translated to over a dozen languages. Every fortnight in the world according to Arena Shukerman we traverse the geopolitical landscape and delve into pressing international issues and gain insight from Arena's expert perspective. Welcome to the show once again. Thank you.

(00:59) Always glad to be here. Wonderful. Wonderful. So, several big topics again today, Arena. And so, let's start with Venezuela. What's happening with US Venezuela? A lot of people are thinking it will be a it could be a war uh or or many people think that it is just brinkmanship and there will be some solution or do you think there will be a new front opening up after Ukraine, after Middle East and now this? How does it look like from where you are? Well, look, there's a couple of things going on. First, Trump's policy um of

(01:37) refocusing attention on the Western Hemisphere and even focusing on issues close to home. Um considered home front, the revival of the Monroe Doctrine is a perfect illustration of that. It fits every criteria. Um, and it illustrates a more muscular US policy, but one that is uh kept basically uh to its own uh borders and its own uh spheres of interest in um its own backyard so to speak.

(02:20) At the same time, it provides a perfect distraction from inconvenient domestic scandals like the Epstein files and um and the fact that the clock is running for Trump to um essentially release for Trump for the Trump administration and for uh Congress to release whatever is left of uh of their records related to those files whatever they may be. So Venezuela is both a policy and a distraction.

(02:49) Um and it provides a perfect opportunity for a mix of signaling contingency planning and there is also of course a genuine frustration with Kacus. Um and the Trump administration is genuinely trying to ramp up the pressure on the Maduro regime. They did designate him under terrorism statutes which reframes the whole situation from a political annoyance and a geopolitical contestation to a security problem.

(03:22) But so far there is still no sign of a clear decision for a large scale invasion or for that matter even for limited land strikes. We have seen the policy uh slowly escalating uh including with the with the designation of cartels as terrorist organizations which according uh to Trump justifies the lethal strikes launched against the boats accusing of transporting uh drugs which um those drugs are being viewed as deadly weapons uh essentially.

(03:57) Um, it's also true that the Pentagon, no matter the situation, always maintains options for regional crisis and Venezuela, no doubt, sits in a sensitive neighborhood that affects energy markets, migration, and the credibility of US red lines. So, there are military options on the table, but that is also the case for many other places where the war is very far from even rhetoric.

(04:26) What changes the mood from mere escalation and pressure to a potential um war scenario is when those options move into active exercise stage including forward deployments and specific targeting discussions. uh this is what the Latin American governments are currently watching to see whether we will start moving from that uh from uh more general kind of discussions to something much more specific.

(05:00) Rumors of violations of international law um harboring sanctioned actors repression against opposition groups are just a narrative frame that can justify some coercive measures. Washington can always choose to portray military steps as a enforcement of an emerging international consensus rather than unilateral aggression. The problem is that is not clear card.

(05:23) There are some countries who are siding with the White House on this like Trinidad and Tobago. But on the other hand, Colombia and the United Kingdom, which is one of the US closest allies, have already um frozen intelligence cooperation over what they claim to be a violation of international laws related to the strike to the allegedly unauthorized strikes over those boats.

(05:52) Um, you know, for now, the Trump administration has stated that there is no legal authority yet to move forward with um actual attacks on Venezuela proper. Uh, they know that stretching doctrines like self-defense or responsibility to protect to fit this current scenario would be even more politically explosive than what's going on now.

(06:17) And even now, Congress is already unhappy. There's been a bipartisan statement um uh essentially looking into the B boat strikes and demanding uh responses from the uh from the Pentagon concerning um Secretary of Defense Pete Hex's alleged uh authoriz authorization of a second deadly strike and and the controversy over whether or not he called to kill the survivors, kill all of the remaining survivors of one of the earlier strikes in those boats and uh nobody also wants to copicate behavior from rival powers in their own regions. So there needs to be

(07:04) a careful balance. uh we we have seen uh some move of US troops and ships but those can be easily interpreted as mere deterrence to prevent Maduro from escalating and to prevent from other state actors like Russia, China or Iran from moving uh their own ships and uh blocking uh the uh blocking the US Navy which they have threatened to do.

(07:36) Um sanctions are of course always on the table. Uh but the more the White House talks about all options, the more those options need to be refined so that they can actually be executed if needed. Um essentially if the political leaders end up feeling cornered by their own rhetoric, that bureaucratic momentum can be quite dangerous.

(08:08) Um, nobody wants to a repeat of Iraq and Afghanistan where there was no exit plan and US ended up being stuck for many years expending trillions of dollars and uh sacrificing li lives um in favor of unclear and goals with very limited and uncertain commitment. Um right now US has no access strategy on Venezuela.

(08:38) There is also a lack of clarity about any transition uh if the Maduro regime is ousted. Allegedly, US may be willing to back um uh Maria Machadu who won the Nobel Peace Prize and who's considered to be a unifying opposition figure. But nevertheless, I doubt that the Trump administration, given its isolationist tendencies, is going to be willing to stay there for a long time to provide extensive security support that any new government will surely need given the level of infiltration of the security apparatus by um Maduro uh lieutenants. A large ground war in the chemist would also be wildly unpopular

(09:22) with the Trump base. Uh even and there are those who are even suspicious of regime change narratives no matter how tempting that they might be considering that Maduro is really a perfect foil. He's invited terrorist regimes and terrorist organizations. This is something that Rubio stated earlier. The hawks inside the administration uh would probably support a short sharp operation focused on key regime assets or on specific non-state or foreign infrastructure. However, history suggests that even limited rates

(10:03) can spiral into open-ended commitments and that risk tempers the more ambitious voices in the room whether in Congress or inside the administration. Now, the Latin American governments are seriously concerned about a return to old interventionist patterns. There is a sorted history of US involvement in regime change in Latin America and a great deal of populist fervor over that issue that is conveniently used by unfriendly regimes to ratchet up um against the US whenever there is any sort of escalation. Even those who dislike Kacus worry that a precedent for forceful regime change

(10:49) uh in the area would eventually be used against them. They might be welcoming pressure in Maduro but they will publicly denounce talk of war as such. So this dual posture also complicates US attempts to assemble a coalition of supporters who would provide diplomatic or logistical cover.

(11:16) Yes, there's a couple of Caribbean countries for very happy with this development but they may not be enough. Another issue is whether international law is going to be at all disregarded uh or the opposite. You know, Washington is as I said pointing to the Venezuelan collusion with drug cartels and terrorist organizations such as hisbola as a transnational threat.

(11:39) Meanwhile, Kacus and its allies are hiding behind the idea of sovereignty in the UN charter. So we are seeing also a legal tug of war with every side cherry picking doctrines. US officials understand that the more ambiguous the legal basis for any such operation, the more there'll be reputational damage.

(12:05) if that operation goes badly and there is a good chance that it might go badly given the sorted record of unsuccessful covered ops um towards regime change in Cuba by the CIA for instance. Um another constraint is the concept of the global energy market. Venezuela still holds immense reserves even if its production capacity is degraded and it's sorely in debt to China.

(12:38) A conflict disrupting oil flows or threatening wider regional instability would hit prices and complicate inflation management at the time where there is already economic concerns among uh Trump's base. So any economic concerns will also uh uh will also limit any enthusiasm for uh escalation past a certain point. Um meanwhile the the Maduro supporters are actually deliberately uh capitalizing on this rhetoric to consolidate internal support uh and portraying themselves as the shield against uh alleged American imperial aggression reinforcing nationalist narratives that resonate with at least some segments of the population against

(13:27) all. um their position is in a dilemma. If they align too openly with Washington, they can be branded as foreign puppets. If they distance themselves, they can risk losing US backing. So Machado remains relatively quiet on that front. Russia and China have essentially been evacuating their own people.

(13:53) They don't wish to get in the middle of this. For them, the Isaiah is a logistical, military, economic goal mine, but that doesn't mean that they're willing to stretch themselves thin and get in the middle of a conflict should such a conflict occur. And right now, they definitely do not want to inflame uh uh to inflame tensions even further and give Trump any reason to escalate because they don't want to risk their own investments in that part of the world. for Moscow.

(14:33) A crisis um in the Western Hemisphere could distract US attention and resources for Europe from Europe. So, they'll be happy to get out of the way and get Trump or potentially stuck in Venezuela. For China, it's a threat to energy and resource investments, but at the same time, it's it's a great example of Western overreach that the China can trump it from international platforms.

(14:55) And as far as Iran is concerned, uh solidarity with Venezuela is just fits into its general standoff with the United States. Um but but uh you know, Trump is well aware that any action taken against Maduro will be interpreted globally as part of a broader struggle and not just a local policing operation.

(15:22) So in reality, US is in fact preparing for a spectrum of contingencies but not just a single grand war plan. Uh these can range from evacuations and limited strikes against specific assets to blockades and clandestine support for internal actors. But the danger lies in how quickly the situation can slide from signaling into actual combat.

(15:50) If an incident at sea or the border goes wrong, the escalation ladder is real. It serves a purpose, but once it's climbed, it is hard to descend without visible concession from one side or the other. Absolutely, Arena. Absolutely. So when you move to a position of you know alert advisory warning about airspace and almost all almost all other airlines have not ventured into except for few countries neighbor neighboring countries if I understand where does uh it leave both the trick because if you don't do what you said then it leaves the present uh Venezuelan leadership much more stronger they can say we have even you know able to push back on the US

(16:31) aggression if you do what happens to the to to Trump's image, USS image as another attempt of, you know, changing governments at will. How does it all look like? Well, well, to be honest, this is all still within the sphere of limited and targeted escalation that is meant to constrain and put pressure on the regime, but without crossing the line that could lead to uh, you know, a place where it's impossible to deescalate from.

(17:07) Closing the skies is a warning, but it's also an economic pressure point. And frankly, most airlines would rather not risk any potential incident, even if US has really no intention of going any further than sanctions and threatening rhetoric and deterrence um measures such as movements of ships in the area.

(17:33) It does however cause a real problem for Maduro because supplies cannot reach by skies. It limits his ability uh to travel and to welcome uh international visitors and it also signals isolation that is uh that makes it easier for other countries to take reciprocate measures and to distance themselves even further from Venezuela. It actually does not hurt us all that much uh because they haven't actually done anything other than send a word of warning and this rhetorical message is actually it's a very powerful tool so far honestly if not of the if not for the handling of the way these strikes on

(18:17) votes is conducted I would say that so far the administration has been handling this issue relatively well. The problem of course is is because of the way the Trump administration rushed to um expand executive power rather than coordinate with Congress and provide factual and legal basis for those tracks.

(18:39) They have a unwanted scrutiny from Congress and unwanted controversy over legal issues um on their hands which was entirely avoidable. There was always a perfect way to deal with this issue uh without um without essentially picking a fight with Congress. All Trump had to do is exactly what George W.

(19:09) Bush uh did uh when after the al-Qaeda attacks on 911 asked for uh an authorization for a military operation in self-defense. The administration has already built the case by designating um these cartels as terrorists and essentially making the case that they're transporting drugs that can that uh such as fentanil which is particularly deadly.

(19:39) It could have strengthened its case by claiming that these cartels are working with terrorist regimes potentially transporting weapons as well. Um all of this could have been um used as a basis for for for an authorization from Congress and then the administration would have been in the clear completely. But uh this is not what's happening. Absolutely. Absolutely. We'll keep an eye on what's happening in that part of the world.

(20:06) Let's move on to another part of the world. Uh US, Israel and and obviously the Gaz Gaza plan. So what's happening? Phase two of Gaza plan. What is that about? And you also talk about Hamas still very much there. So who is winning, who is losing? Are we is it really going to be phase two? So so far every sign is pointing to the fact that phase two is falling apart at it seems.

(20:49) First of all, Israel has been very distinctively asking um uh um did I lose you for a second? Okay. No, no problem. No problem. Sorry. Yeah. uh Israel has been asking us to hold off from moving forward uh until first of all the remaining two uh bodies of the hostages are returned. Uh today Islamic jihad through Hamas returned a body which apparently is just a random corpse that does not belong to anyone in particular and certainly not anyone Israel has been demanding.

(21:24) Um but but that's not the only obstacle to implementation. Uh first of all, Gaza has been divided into two zones. One under Israel control, one under Hamas control. Israel cannot stay in the in its own portion forever. Even if it turns it into a temporary buffet zone, it's only a matter of time until Hamas, if it remains in power, attacks even that.

(21:51) to say nothing of the fact that if Israel withdraws completely uh kamas will immediately uh move back and frankly even remaining letting kamas remain in any portion of Gaza guarantees that sooner or later combat will resume. Uh however, the United States said that it does not have the means to enforce Hamas disarmament and that the administration was willing to move forward with reconstruction in the portion of the of Gaza which is under Israeli control.

(22:29) None of that is to is of great advantage because it sends the message that it is that US and other countries are willing to put in money to reconstruct Gaza without any concessions from Hamas and uh essentially allow that infrastructure to be destroyed in due time during yet another escalation whenever that may be. Hamas also bears no accountability whatsoever for the damage it has caused for the past two years of war and intervention each other everything that came before that.

(23:02) Um so we are seeing kind of a an situation. Uh many countries have committed to a future stabilizing force but nobody wants to move until Hamas is disarmed and dislodged. Um, nobody wants to risk their own people and resources.

(23:26) And quite frankly, for non-Arab states, it's particularly difficult to operate in the area since they do not speak local languages and nothing but confusion would ensue from a multinational force um in the middle of a war. Um so uh the situation is sort of a at a standstill. Um many expect that uh once Israel recovers all the bodies they will eventually the ceasefire will just naturally fall apart.

(23:55) There's already been assorted incidents of Israel eliminating various uh terrorists. Um it mostly eliminated the terrorists who were stuck in Rafa underground. Hamas has um and Israel did not come to an agreement over the evacuation uh of those Hamas fighters. So we are seeing that there's no real solution.

(24:26) Essentially uh the more time passes the more it appears that perhaps US should have moved with Egypt's uh plan originally and Egypt has been in the meantime training Palestinians to take over as a stabilizing force in Gaza. But regardless, um, US wanted the American brand name on the reconstruction process and they wanted to be in control of the process.

(24:52) But unfortunately, there seems to be no credible way of resolving a situation in a way that that prevents the repetition of the events that led to the current um predicament. uh without holding Hamas accountable and mandating its um removal from Gaza, there's absolutely no way that anyone can guarantee long-term security in Gaza and and to Israel. And in the meantime, also the situation in West Bank is not so good.

(25:25) Hamas pockets are receiving assistance from Iran, including weapons. Islamic jihad is also escalating. Israel is going in and out with assorted security operations. So it's becoming an increasingly unstable minefield on on its own. Absolutely. Absolutely. Arena. And now let's move on to the Ukraine uh thing. Peace was supposed to come in but this seems to be not working.

(25:57) All this plan has gone into a major controversy and source of embarrassment. what's happening to the Russia Ukraine peace process and and you see if I see from that point of view it's almost like one year to Mr. Trump's getting into, you know, second time in office and he promised that he will bring peace to both these places. Forget about peace either in the Middle East or in Gaza or in Russia Ukraine thing.

(26:23) The Venezuela thing has opened up. How does it look like the will the peace prevail at all in the coming future in UK in in the Russia Ukraine thing or is it you know uh is it going to be much more time? Unfortunately, the peace process for the sake of process itself is doing nothing but giving a a cover of legitimacy for Putin to continue striking uh civilians in Ukraine.

(26:55) And by the way, question remains over whether Pentagon deliveries of weapons they were committed to resumed after the end of the shutdown in the United States. That's not a question that has been raised. I presume that they have but who knows. In the meantime uh this process has become a force. It uh clearly um the 28 point plan originated in Moscow.

(27:24) It was sold uh to the United States through very compromised interlocutors, basically business people with little geopolitical knowledge and an incentive to uh try to stay in the game for their own financial benefit. Uh we have now seen leaked evidence of Vitkov literally co uh uh literally coaching Russians on how to approach the Trump administration which is which begs the question whose side is Vitkov really on? It reminds me, as I mentioned elsewhere, of um Rob Miley, the Obama and Biden Iran envoy and interlocutor who ended up uh being removed from his position um

(28:10) albeit without any legal consequences for uh mishandling classified information and essentially leaking uh the US strategy to Iran with the hopes of helping them get to a deal. And Bitco seems to be valuing this idea of having Russia succeed in selling its own version of events above the fact that they're literally manipulating US policy with the way this whole thing was presented. He in my opinion is doing Trump no favors in that regard.

(28:48) This blow up caused such a huge embarrassment that it put even Secretary of State Ruby in an awkward position. He initially admitted that this was a Russian plan to two senators he was talking to on the phone. Then he had to retract and claim that this was an American plan. In other words, he had to blatantly lie about the sequence of events to protect Vitkov and the administration which had essentially was backing Vitkov.

(29:20) Vitkov Kushner despite you know the fact that Ukraine basically rejected the terms in their form and Ukraine and Europeans basically came up with 19 different terms some of which may overlap with some of the less controversial points in their original plan but essentially seems to have been rewritten for from scratch though it has not been publicized so nobody knows what we are really talking about Kushner and Vitkov, the same people who screwed up this whole thing to begin with, were sent on a mission to talk to Putin despite the fact that Putin had already basically stated that he would reject the 19point version and

(30:06) essentially he was not interested in compromises. He was not making interested in making any concessions of his own. Nevertheless, they came and they talked for nearly five hours and all we know about that is that none none of that discussion touched on any specifics of the language in the plan.

(30:27) They talked at best in broad in very broad terms and and the Chinese foreign minister was also present which raises a spectre of even bigger controversy about this whole discussion. Why was China which is not a party to the conflict uh involved in the discussions about uh confidential discussions presumably about the the so-called peace plan and were they negotiating other separate things that had nothing to do with the situation or were they trying to get China to broker some sort of agreement with Russia? Nobody knows and none of it is looking very good. In the meantime, US have been

(31:09) bring has been bringing up the spectre of blocking Ukraine's um entry to NATO which is already practically speaking um is blocked because um you cannot enter NATO if a portion of your territory is occupied. Uh so uh these deliberations in Miami between Ukrainian and um American uh diplomats too have not led to any major breakthroughs.

(31:43) Quite frankly, a lot of these discussions seem like nothing more but recycling of the talking points that we have been that have been brought up again and again mostly by Russia since the start of um diplomatic uh efforts on on this front. I don't see anything new.

(32:08) The only thing new is that the Ukrainian team is now headed by a new uh a new person um after uh the former chief of staff for Zilinsk was forced out of power due to his alleged links to an energy corruption scandal in Ukraine. Uh that is the only thing that's changed. Everything else remains the repetition of the same trap the Trump administration seems to have been falling over and over and over again.

(32:40) And all of that seems to be nothing more but a reward for private deal for Putin in exchange for private business deals for Trump's uh people family members and close business associates in terms of global or national interest. I do not see any of that being met here. Absolutely absolutely several points there you know people several points of conflict in different parts of the world another we are seeing is China Japan standoff after one of its uh people's talked about the beheading threat and amidst all these things how do how does this seem to be

(33:19) panning out means why should they suddenly get into this war of words and why is it not a beating well It started with a shocking a really shocking demonstration of brazen political overreach by China when its council general in Japan literally threatened the prime the newly newly elected prime minister to behead her if she essentially supports Taiwan against China's claims.

(33:57) And this is shocking language for anybody against any public figure much less for a professional diplomat. Um the fact that uh you know frankly that he wasn't expelled immediately and the entire mission hasn't been closed to me is also rather surprising. However, it's very clear that Japan was trying to balance between appearing strong among its allies but at the same time not starting a needless fight with China.

(34:29) So um they simply rhetorically uh expressed protest about this u development and also reiterated support of ton which was which led to a diplomatic uh escalation uh including boycots of Japanese products and travel and uh even a Japanese pop star being unceremoniously escorted off stage in the middle of a concert as if she had any political decision making capacity.

(34:54) At the same time, Japan started taking measures to uh for self-defense and for potential uh defense uh in the event of a Taiwan related escalation. Um essentially, Japan has the capacity to block some of the naval routes to Taiwan that would cause hinder any um acts of aggression by China quite significantly.

(35:20) and that has become the point of an even greater contention. As a result, uh the controversy escalated when it was alleged in the media that Trump after his phone call with she told uh Japan to cool down the tensions and the tone. Uh Japanese media contradicted it and claimed he had said no such thing. So it's not clear whether he did or he didn't and why somebody would report that he did.

(35:52) But um regardless uh the situation has only been ramping up with additional uh calls by by the Chinese government and the media to boycott traveling to Japan and to boycott Japanese uh goods such as seafood. uh and Japan for its own part has been looking to strengthen relations with South Korea, with the Philippines and other neighbors.

(36:22) So this is where the situation um currently uh stands. um uh it's not yet at the point of uh of a new blows, but uh essentially it has actually um uh put Taiwan in a in the middle of a in the middle of the standoff because uh Taiwan on the one hand is committing to buying more weapons and spending more, but it's also under a lot of pressure.

(36:52) one of its two leading parties, the opposition party has essentially started squarely backing China and um uh all of that is signaling a potential uh and growing polarization inside the country. And China is not the only issue. Of course, one of the biggest controversies is nuclear energy.

(37:21) the fact that the ruling party has uh actually once come to power in being anti-uclear but um consequent developments made such a position impracticable and yet um and left Taiwan largely dependent on foreign support with the US being increasingly unlikely to intervene directly in the event of an attack. um the questions raised about the about whether this political position is sustainable or even makes any sense given the improvements in nuclear safety in recent years.

(37:57) Um so of course Taiwan is reading any China and Japan spike as the as relevant to its own security given that it shares the main adversary and sits within overlapping maritime and air zones. uh it's essentially shows is showing solidarity with Japan and is seen as a part of a broader coalition of states facing coercion from Beijing.

(38:26) Um but the Chinese officials are using it as an excuse to claim that Taiwan is an internal issue not a peer actor. Uh for now we have avoided any direct uh clashes uh between anybody other than through rhetoric. But of course um uh back channels crisis communication lines are more critical than ever. And this standoff ultimately underscores the fragility of East Asian stability.

(38:56) A single threat or shocking turn of phrase can end months of careful risk management and um even bilateral tensions are unlikely to stay bilateral for long. Every flare up will have ripple effects where in the region where alliances, historical grievances and strategic chocting. Uh so um while I do not think that this situation will get out of hand in terms of physical actions, I think covert activities, cyber attacks, uh continued rhetorical and diplomatic escalation and trade tensions for sure are likely to

(39:38) remain in the near future. Absolutely. Absolutely. Now let's move on to this part of the world. uh President Putin is expected to be in India. So ho how does it look like what what the talk will all about what the deals will be all about? I don't know. Well, one of the biggest issues of course is going to be defense trade with a big deal looming um on the horizon.

(40:11) Uh India is looking to uh uh to essentially continue and um uh uh to continue its uh trade uh uh its arms deal. Um uh the Russia India defense relationship is nothing new even amid shifting global alignments. India has of course long relied on Russian systems for aircraft, tanks, submarines and missiles. maintenance upgrade in interoperability are still tying their two militaries in um a new deal is a signal that New Delhi does not intend to abruptly severe these links and for Moscow of course India is still a crucial market and a political asset. In fact, uh in preparation for the visit, RT India um launched uh

(40:59) earlier this week. This gives uh Russian media a huge opportunity to expand their reach with the already somewhat sympathetic Indian public and exploit the tensions with the trade tensions with the United States. Um, of course, Western sanctions and isolation from many high-tech markets are pushing Russia to lean more on partners who are still willing to buy its hardware and to engage in co- production.

(41:33) So, a major deal with India would offer revenue, industrial activity, and develop message that Russia is not globally isolated. It also provides leverage in other relationships since Moscow can hint at alternative buyers if other countries start rejecting its arms. For India, there is a sort of a complex strategic calculation because still and despite these trade um tariff concerns, it is still depending ties with the US and Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners while still being largely dependent on Russian gear. Of course, any new deals uh will inevitably lead to

(42:14) some level of criticism in the west uh which see major purchases as money indirectly supporting Russian conflict capacity elsewhere including um Ukraine. Uh so for Prime Minister Modi the messaging will have to be carefully uh crafted uh to uh to reflect the operational advantages of continuity but also to to blunt the impact of any diplomatic cost of being seen as Moscow's uh best customer.

(42:55) Uh and of course what ultimately uh happens whether the deal is presented as simply building on existing systems that India cannot easily obtain from the west or from its own domestic industry. Um it will be it can be framed as a pragmatic necessity if it also involves completely new major platforms.

(43:22) Critics can argue that India is looking into long-term reliance on the supplier under heavy sanctions. Um, of course, for Russia um to make that sort of progress, it will have to offer very favorable terms and technology transfer and joint production. Um, it's historically been no willing some western suppliers including the US especially to share knowhow at least on older systems. Um and any new co- production arrangements would create local jobs and feed into India's drive for strategic autonomy and uh appeal to the political narrative of a self-reliant India which of course would make a lot of people happy. But of

(44:02) course uh uh China is also watching this uh this potential major defense related breakthrough understanding that Russia and India have their own friction points including um border tensions and even competing interests in central Asia among other things.

(44:29) Uh and also China is not altogether thrilled about that relationship. A robust Russia India defense pipeline complicates China's military calculation and China has been investing more and more heavily into Russia's defense industry and does not necessarily want it going to other clients. Um, it coordinates with Russia on many strategic issues and Moscow selling arms to Beijing's rival while protesting alignment with Beijing against the West.

(45:03) All of that creates a very odd situation. And these things are of course presenting US and Europe with a dilemma. They still want India as a partner in balancing China. But they are also not thrilled about major Indian purchases of Russian arms even as uh India has cut down significantly on its purchase of oil uh over sanctions.

(45:34) Um they may respond by accelerating offers of their own um expanding joint exercises or deepening defense cooperation but they may not um ultimately match Russia's willingness to localize production or to accept for instance rupee based payments. This is not something US is willing to do for instance and that asymmetry is what gives ultimately gives Russia economic leverage in this situation.

(46:01) Of course, inside India, there's there's uh a domestic debate going on about modernization and diversification. Um many believe that over relying on Russian systems burdens the military with equipment uh that may suffer from sanctions induced supply problems and technological stagnation. Others claimed that breaking with Russia too abruptly would create dangerous capability gaps and damage a relationship that had served well for decades.

(46:35) But for Putin ultimately it's not just about the deal and the money. It's also about the optics of standing besides Modi. And it's as important as the technical details. Uh it helps him project an image of relevance and global reach. He can show his domestic audiences and other partners that still he still has access to one of the world's most important leaders and markets and it creates an aura of normaly vital to Kremlin which is trying to downplay the impact of western pressure and isolation.

(47:08) Ultimately any big arms deals with Russia will complicate India's uh path towards a more balanced supplier portfolio. The more Russian systems it buys now, the more it has to maintain and integrate years down the line. Uh and that reality will ensure that Russia remains embedded in Indian defense planning regardless of how much um India may want to tilt towards the west rhetorically.

(47:40) So essentially we seeing a very Gordian noat that neither side is yet willing to cut definitively. Absolutely. Absolutely. With this it's a wrap on this very special edition of the world according to Arina Shukerman on the KJ masterclass live. Thank you so much indeed for joining us. Thank you.